Background and Context
The Baghdad Declaration stands as the principal communiqué of the twin summits convened in Baghdad, Iraq – the 34th Ordinary Session of the Arab League and the 5th Arab Economic and Social Development Summit in May 2025. These high-level deliberations engaged with a spectrum of existential challenges confronting the Arab world, including the war in Gaza and Palestine’s enduring quest for statehood, the protracted Syrian conflict, regional peace and security dynamics, and the evolving strategic posture of Arab states in the global order.
Among the thematic pillars of the declaration was the pronounced elevation of “Arab water security” to the status of a shared strategic imperative – characterized not only as a developmental concern, but as a matter of national and collective security. Although couched in broad diplomatic language, the declaration’s appeal for the safeguarding of “legitimate water rights” for Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and Syria unmistakably alludes to the region’s three principal transboundary freshwater systems: the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Jordan River. These river basins serve as vital hydrological arteries for the MENA region and are, as such, imbued with geostrategic salience.
Crucially, however, the headwaters of two of these systems – the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates – originate outside the Arab world, in Ethiopia and Turkey respectively. Both countries, non-Arab and upstream, occupy structurally advantageous positions within their respective basins. Similarly, in the Jordan River basin, the dominant riparian is Israel, another non-Arab state. As such, the conflicts over these river systems are not merely disputes over hydrological allocation; they are entangled in questions of sovereignty, regional hegemony, and collective identity.
The invocation of Arab water security, particularly in reference to these shared transboundary rivers, appears to serve the particular geopolitical aspirations of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria – most notably Egypt’s ongoing effort to “Arabize” the governance discourse surrounding the Nile River. This strategic reframing seeks to recast the Nile not as a pan-African resource governed by the principles of international law and equitable utilization, but as an Arab interest subject to regional solidarity mechanisms.
Egypt has historically leveraged multilateral Arab platforms, especially the Arab League, to entrench its hydro-political claims over the Nile, often at odds with the equitable rights of upstream riparian states. Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in Cairo’s sustained campaign to elevate the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) from a bilateral and technical matter to a regionally politicized issue. Under the guise of shared concern, the Arab League has issued a series of declarations in support of Egypt’s position – actions which arguably exceed its mandate and blur the line between solidarity and interference. The most recent and conspicuous expression of this alignment is the aforementioned Baghdad Declaration of 17 May 2025, which officially reiterates that water security constitutes a foundational pillar of Arab national security and explicitly champions Egypt’s stance.
From Ethiopia’s perspective, this maneuver represents a direct affront to international water law and the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization enshrined in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. Since formally launching the GERD in 2011, Ethiopia has consistently maintained that the project will not adversely affect the water security of downstream states and has repeatedly extended invitations for dialogue aimed at fostering mutual trust and regional cooperation. In addition to engaging in successive rounds of tripartite negotiations with Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia has expressed a consistent commitment to transparency and technical collaboration.
Nevertheless, Egypt continues to depict the GERD as an existential threat, framing the project in alarmist and securitized terms. This posture belies the technical realities of the dam and serves primarily to preserve Egypt’s historical hydro-hegemonic status. In international fora, Cairo has escalated its rhetoric and lobbied for multilateral intervention. In response to these appeals, the Arab League passed a resolution calling upon the United Nations Security Council to take “appropriate measures” regarding the GERD. Ethiopia categorically rejected this resolution, denouncing it as an unwarranted politicization of a fundamentally African issue. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia underscored, “The GERD is an African issue. The disagreement between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan can only be resolved through…the spirit of finding African solutions for African problems.”
The Arab League’s position – ostensibly one of regional solidarity – may in fact reflect deeper strategic anxieties, particularly Egypt’s urgent need to secure alternative water sources amid increasing scarcity. Cairo’s expanding infrastructure initiatives in the Sinai Peninsula, including large-scale agricultural and residential developments in arid desert zones, exemplify this imperative. The Nile, in this context, is not simply a river but a potential solution to the Arab world’s looming water crisis. Historical analogues, such as Saudi Arabia’s ultimately abandoned 1976 plan to tow Antarctic icebergs to the Red Sea, illustrate the scale of the region’s desperation for hydrological security.
While the Arab League lacks the juridical authority to redefine the Nile as an Arab resource, it has already succeeded in shifting the discourse – effectively Arabizing the political agenda. This symbolic transformation, though lacking in legal substance, carries profound implications for regional diplomacy and inter-basin cooperation. Ultimately, the question of the GERD and the broader governance of the Nile River must be addressed through a cooperative, inclusive, and legally grounded framework – one that respects the sovereign rights and developmental aspirations of all basin states. The path forward lies not in politicized declarations or hegemonic posturing, but in a genuine commitment to shared prosperity, regional integration, and sustainable transboundary water management.
Strategic Implications of Nile Arabization
It is evident that the Arab League’s recurrent declarations in support of Egypt’s water security posture are not without consequence. These statements bear significant implications for Ethiopia’s national security and risk undermining broader regional stability. More critically, such interventionist rhetoric threatens to erode the institutional credibility of the League itself, while simultaneously undercutting the African Union’s ongoing mediation efforts regarding the Nile River dispute.
The Arabization of the Nile – both in narrative and political positioning – constitutes a marked departure from the foundational principles enshrined in the Arab League’s own charter, which emphasizes cooperation, mutual respect, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. By choosing confrontation over collaboration, the League is not only violating its normative commitments but also setting a counterproductive precedent for regional engagement. History offers instructive lessons in this regard: adversarial posturing has failed to produce meaningful resolutions in past water conflicts, most notably those involving the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The same logic holds for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), where politicized intervention has thus far proven ineffective.
Ethiopia’s position on GERD remains consistent and firmly anchored in international law and the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization. No deviation from cooperative diplomacy – whether through pressure or politicization – will alter this legitimate stance. As underscored by Samar Al-Bagoury, head of the Nile Basin Studies Center at Cairo University, “Previous interventions by the Arab League did not yield any results.” This candid admission reflects the broader futility of externalizing hydropolitical disputes and reaffirms the necessity of regional dialogue grounded in mutual respect and legal parity.
Erosion of the African Union’s Mediation Role
Mediation efforts between Ethiopia and the lower riparian states concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were formally initiated under the leadership of former African Union (AU) Chairperson, President Cyril Ramaphosa, in 2020. With the onset of the AU-led negotiation framework, the involved parties presented divergent preferences regarding both the mediation platform and the agenda itself. Ethiopia consistently expressed a strong preference for an African-led process, rooted in regional legitimacy and guided by mutual interests. In contrast, Egypt has repeatedly sought to internationalize the dispute, appealing to the United Nations Security Council and other extra-regional bodies.
In the face of these competing orientations, the AU has assumed primary responsibility for the mediation process, anchored in its foundational doctrine of “African Solutions to African Problems” (AfSol). This approach reflects a deeper recognition: that externally imposed solutions to intra-African challenges have historically proven either ineffective or actively detrimental. Egypt’s continued efforts to secure Western or UN-led intervention have yielded little progress – largely due to persistent concerns about the impartiality, contextual understanding, and legitimacy of such actors.
By contrast, the AU’s mediation offers a platform that is geographically proximate, politically neutral, and philosophically committed to regional ownership. It remains the most viable and principled avenue for resolving the GERD dispute in a manner that respects the sovereignty and development aspirations of all Nile Basin states.
National Security Risks to Ethiopia
The agenda of Arabizing the Nile waters stands in direct opposition to Ethiopia’s vital national interests, posing a serious threat to its sovereignty and long-term security. The interventionist posture adopted by the Arab League is particularly dissonant given that several of its member states – most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – have traditionally projected themselves as neutral mediators within the Horn of Africa. Yet, the League’s recent declarations reflect a confrontational tone, seeking to overtly securitize and reframe the Nile River as an Arab concern. This approach is especially troubling in light of Ethiopia’s consistent calls for equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile’s resources—a vision firmly rooted in international legal norms and cooperative principles.
Ethiopia has advocated for a basin-wide framework that ensures fair access to shared water resources, emphasizing mutual benefit and sustainable development. In contrast, the Arab League’s unilateral endorsement of Egypt’s hydro-political claims represents a clear deviation from neutrality and undermines ongoing regional diplomacy.
In conclusion, the Arab League’s repeated declarations in support of Egypt’s water security claims are both biased and untenable. They risk delegitimizing Africa’s established mechanisms for conflict resolution, which have demonstrated the continent’s capacity for sovereign, effective, and peaceful dispute settlement. The League’s alignment with Egypt’s narrative not only exceeds its institutional mandate but constitutes a form of political interference that compromises regional stability.
Nonetheless, it is imperative that Ethiopia continues to engage constructively with regional bodies, including the Arab League, in order to preemptively address and neutralize subversive efforts to distort the governance of the Nile. Proactive diplomatic engagement, underpinned by legal clarity and strategic consistency, remains essential to safeguarding Ethiopia’s interests while preserving the cooperative potential of the Nile Basin.
About the authors
Amare K. Aweke (PhD) is the Middle East Affairs Research Director General at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA).
Mohammed Seid (PhD) and Suadiq Sufiyan (PhD), Senior Researchers of the Middle East Affairs Department at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA)
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