Policy Briefs•12 min read•November 2, 2026

Ethiopia and the Red Sea: A Civilizational Case for Maritime Access. Perspectives from the 12th Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Ethiopia and the Red Sea: A Civilizational Case for Maritime Access. Perspectives from the 12th Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa
Ethiopia and the Red Sea: A Civilizational Case for Maritime Access. Perspectives from the 12th Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa
Executive Summary

With more than 130 million people, Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked country in the world.  On 24 October 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told the Tana High-Level Forum in Bahir Dar that sea access is an existential matter for such a nation. This brief explains why Addis Ababa holds that view and why the position is reasonable. The argument runs on three levels: geography, access, and strategy. The brief also reads the Forum's discussion of Red Sea security as the most practical route to a negotiated settlement that serves Ethiopia and its neighbors alike.

1. The anomaly

Among its historical peers, Ethiopia is the only large state without a coast. Turkey, Iran, India, China, and Italy all descend from old empires, and each is smaller today than its predecessors. None has lost its connection to the water; each is still defined in part by a strait, a gulf, an ocean front, or a sea.
Ethiopia fits the first half of this pattern: an ancient civilization that contracted into a modern state and endured. It departs from the pattern in the second half because among these peers it alone has no coast. The comparison does not suggest that these histories are identical. It shows that a lasting maritime connection is the norm, not the exception, for states of Ethiopia's age and scale. The policy question is how the gap came about and whether it must remain.

2. Civilization with a maritime past

Aksum, the ancestral kingdom of modern Ethiopia, took shape around the first century CE and prospered from its position between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.  Its port at Adulis attracted traders from Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Arabia, and by the sixth century Aksum's authority extended across the water to southern Arabia. Ancient sources describe Adulis as part of a trade network that linked the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean in the middle of the first century. 

Ethiopia's interest in the Red Sea today therefore revives a thread that runs back to the earliest years of its statehood. The historical record explains the depth of this interest. It does not by itself settle how access should be arranged, which is a matter for negotiation.

3. The Retreat to the Highlands

Aksum declined after Rome fell and the trade that sustained it dried up. [2] The center of gravity moved south and inland, into highlands that protected Ethiopia's independence for centuries. The same terrain drew later with political capitals, Lalibela and Gondar among them, away from the coast.
Ethiopia did not turn away from the sea. Shifting regional balances and the pressure of rival powers made the highlands the safest base, and the mountains became a refuge.

4. The Tana Forum and the Medemer Position

The 12th Tana Forum was held in Bahir Dar from 23 to 25 October under the theme 'Pathways to Peace in Africa: Economic Sovereignty and Geopolitical Transformation. [4] Prime Minister Abiy spoke at the opening alongside Ghana's President John Mahama, who chairs the Forum this year, and African Union Chairperson Evariste Ndayishimiye. 

In his address at the opening session, Prime Minister Abiy argued that planning for future generations is difficult when every route to world markets crosses another country's territory. For a country of more than 130 million, he said, access to the sea is existential, and Ethiopia will continue to pursue it through dialogue and mutual benefit. [1] The report of the speech linked the dependence on foreign ports to sovereignty, security, and trade competitiveness and placed the point within a wider African debate on economic independence. 

The day before, at the Forum's Special Envoy Dialogue, Ambassador Redwan Hussen said that no small group of states can guarantee the security of the Red Sea alone. He cited growing militarization, rivalry between outside powers, and renewed attacks on merchant shipping and noted that Ethiopia's maritime trade is entirely dependent on that sea. [7] The Forum does not negotiate binding agreements, but its value lies in how it frames the issue.  That two senior Ethiopian officials raised the matter on a high-level African diplomacy and security platform shows the priority the government attaches to it.

These remarks continued a line set out on 5 October, when Abiy took the oath for a second term at the opening of the seventh parliament and the Prime Minister's Office named the new administration the 'Medemer Government.' [8] In his address, he said that Ethiopian civilization cannot be fully realized without a port of entry and exit. [9] In his statements, the prime minister has emphasized a diplomatic approach based on give and take rather than the use of force. [10] The message has been consistent: History explains why the matter counts, economics explains why it is urgent, and dialogue is the method.
Two features of this structure deserve attention. First, Ethiopia ties its claim to a shared regional interest in the stability of the Red Sea, which broadens its audience beyond its immediate neighbors. Second, by committing publicly to dialogue and mutual benefit, it sets a standard against which its own conduct can be judged and which its partners can be asked to match.

5. Three Levels of Argument

The first level is geography. The heartlands of Turkey, Iran, India, China, and Italy sit on coasts, rivers, and straits. Ethiopia's heartland drifted inland over the centuries, the result of history rather than national preference.

The second is access. The states with which Ethiopia shares an ancient statehood and civilizational ties kept or adapted their maritime reach as empires gave way to modern borders. Ethiopia, through a different and complex historical trajectory, was unable to do so. It lost direct access to the Red Sea in 1993, when Eritrea became independent. [11] Few large historical states have had to manage a gap of this kind.

The third is strategy. Turkey makes use of its straits and Iran of its gulf coast. Ethiopia routes most of its trade through neighboring states, especially Djibouti, and depends on their ports. Unlike most of its historical peers, it lacks the strategic advantages that sea access providers to the protection and promotion of national power. This structural dependence is the limitation the Medemer Government seeks to address.

The three levels reinforce each other. Geography explains how the gap arose, access explains why it persists, and strategy explains why it matters now. Reliance on a small number of corridors also concentrates risk, since a disruption at one port or along one route affects the whole economy. Reliable and diversified access is therefore the underlying objective.

6. Conclusions

Ethiopia's case is best put as a plea for fairness. A civilization of more than two thousand years and more than 130 million people should not have to depend on others for its door to the world.  The Medemer Government can make this case more effectively by pairing its historical foundation with concrete reciprocity, meaning tangible benefits offered to partners in return, and by showing that Ethiopian access would add to the stability of the Red Sea. Keeping the discussion anchored in respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state in the region will also strengthen Ethiopia's credibility with the African Union and its international partners.

7. Policy recommendations

The following steps aim to turn the Tana messaging into a sustained and practical diplomatic effort.
• Maintain momentum. Keep communicating Ethiopia's concerns to regional bodies and the international community in comparable forums, with consistent messaging, until the required goals are met.

• Use the Tana frame as a bridge. The call for shared Red Sea security gives Ethiopia common ground with coastal states. Bring it to the African Union, IGAD, and bilateral talks and propose a structured consultation on Red Sea security and maritime access that is open to both coastal and noncoastal states.

• Pair the historical case with reciprocity. Prepare a set of mutually beneficial options, such as commercial, infrastructure, and security cooperation, which can be presented to partners in bilateral discussions.

• In the meantime, strengthen existing corridors. Deepen the arrangements with current port partners so that trade becomes more dependable and less exposed to disruption while longer-term discussions continue.

• Build an evidence base. Commission a short, data-led study on the economic cost of dependence and the available options, for use in diplomatic briefings and public communication.

• Keep diplomatic language consistent. Emphasize dialogue, mutual benefit, and respect for sovereignty and international law in every public statement, so that the position is received as a cooperative proposal.

Notes

1. 'Ethiopia's Sea Access Pursuit Is an Existential Issue, While Reliable Transport Corridors Hold Wider African Significance, PM Abiy Says,' Fana Media Corporation, 24 October 2026, https://www.fanamc.com/english/ethiopias-sea-access-pursuit-is-an-existential-issue-while-reliable-transport-corridors-hold-wider-african-significance-pm-abiy-says/.

2. 'Aksum,' Encyclopedia Britannica, https://kids.britannica.com/students/article/kingdom-of-Aksum/571178.

3. Monika Schuol, Adulis und Aksum: Global Players im Fernhandel der Antike? Anabasis (2022), https://journals.ur.edu.pl/anabasis/article/view/10428.

4. Tana Forum 2026, Tana Forum, https://tanaforum.org/tana-forum-2026/.

5. '12th Edition of Tana Forum Opens in Bahir Dar,' Fana Media Corporation, 24 October 2026, https://www.fanamc.com/english/12th-edition-of-tana-forum-opens-in-bahir-dar/.

6. 'Ethiopia Elevates Sea Access to Existential Security Issue at Tana Forum,' Birr Metrics, 24 October 2026, https://birrmetrics.com/ethiopia-elevates-sea-access-to-existential-security/.

7. Ethiopia's National Intelligence Chief: Red Sea Security Requires Collective Action Amid Growing Militarization and Foreign Rivalries, Fana Media Corporation, 23 October 2026, https://www.fanamc.com/english/ethiopias-national-intelligence-chief-red-sea-security-requires-collective-action-amid-growing-militarization-and-foreign-rivalries/.

8. 'Ethiopia: Abiy Sworn in for Second Term as Ethiopia Forms New "Medemer Government," allAfrica, 5 October 2026, https://allafrica.com/stories/202610060021.html.

9. Abiy Vows That Ethiopia Will Secure Sea Access and Seeks a Stronger Role in Regional Affairs, Addis Standard, 5 October 2026, https://addisstandard.com/abiy-ahmed-elected-pm-for-new-five-year-term-vows-constitutional-reform-and-pursuit-of-sea-access/.

10. David H. Shinn, "Ethiopian Leader Again Calls for Access to the Red Sea", The Official Blog of Amb. David H. Shinn, 6 October 2026, http://davidshinn.blogspot.com/2026/10/ethiopian-leader-again-calls-for-access.html.

11. 'Ethiopian PM Abiy Demands Red Sea Access as Tensions with Neighbors Rise,' Al Jazeera, 5 October 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/5/ethiopias-pm-insists-on-access-to-red-sea-despite-regional-conflict-threat

 


By Miftah Mohammed Kemal
Researcher, African Affairs Research Directorate



Disclaimer
The content disseminated by the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) – including, but not limited to, publications, public statements, events, media appearances, and digital communications – reflects the views of individual contributors and does not necessarily represent the official positions or policies of the Institute, its partners, or any affiliated governmental or non-governmental entities.
While the IFA endeavours to ensure the accuracy, integrity, and timeliness of the information presented, it makes no representations or warranties, express or implied, regarding the completeness, reliability, or suitability of such content for any purpose. The Institute expressly disclaims any liability for errors or omissions, as well as for any actions taken or decisions made based on the information provided.
The inclusion of external links, references, or third-party resources does not constitute an endorsement by the Institute. Additionally, engagement on social media platforms – including, but not limited to, likes, shares, retweets (RTs), or reposts – shall not be interpreted as an endorsement or validation of the views expressed therein.
Readers and audiences are encouraged to exercise critical judgement and seek independent verification when interpreting or relying upon any information disseminated through publications and posts on the Institute’s platforms or representatives.


#

Share this article