Ethiopia’s Red Sea Strategy: Advancing Maritime Interests and Strategic Autonomy amid Geopolitical Competition

As the world's most populous landlocked nation, Ethiopia heavily relies on maritime routes and port facilities accessed through neighboring countries for its international import and export trade. More than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s import-export trade by volume uses the Addis–Djibouti corridor, according to the World Bank [1], making it vulnerable to high transit costs, security risks, piracy, shipping attacks, and geopolitical competition. Consequently, the security of the Red Sea is paramount to Ethiopia's economic and national security. This challenge is further exacerbated by the surging struggle for influence among global and regional powers in the southern gate of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region.

Ethiopia's primary policy challenge extends beyond mere port access. It encompasses securing reliable, affordable, and diversified access to maritime domains while preserving independent decision-making and avoiding entanglement in competing extra-regional blocs. A strategy of confrontation or reliance on a single external transit partner would expose Ethiopia to domestic political pressure and external shocks

This brief, therefore, recommends a coordinated Red Sea strategy built around the following: a whole-of-government approach, multi-vector diplomacy, a Horn-first foreign policy, diversified commercial corridors, and enhanced maritime-security capabilities. These priorities should be supported by economic resilience and African-led governance through the African Union and Regional Economic Communities. The objective is to advance Ethiopia's interests through peaceful agreements and strategic autonomy.

The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden form a crucial maritime link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, connected by the Bab el-Mandab Strait and the Suez Canal. This vital global trade route faces growing risks from several developments: attacks on international shipping by the Houthis  reported incidents of piracy off the Somali coast, ongoing conflicts and tensions in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia, proliferation of foreign military facilities, and escalating rivalries among Middle Eastern states and international powers. Consequently, this strategically significant area has become a theater of competition with regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Egypt pursuing their respective strategic interests alongside major global powers like the United States, China, and Russia.

These developments present significant challenges for Ethiopia. As the world's most populous landlocked country, Ethiopia is highly reliant on sea routes and its neighbors' transit facilities, making it vulnerable to events happening beyond its borders. Disruptions can increase transit costs, slow trade, undermine supply chains, result in additional inspections, raise information-security concerns, and add to diplomatic pressure. Furthermore, its concentration on a narrow set of routes limits flexibility

Conversely, competition among regional powers also presents opportunities for cooperation in areas such as port development, logistics, energy, investment, and security. To be viable, these relationships must align with national agendas and priorities. Consequently, Ethiopia must manage competing actors without allowing any single partnership to unduly influence its broader foreign policy.

Predictable access to the sea is critical for Ethiopia to boost economic development, safeguard vital trade, and minimize exposure to external shocks. Ethiopia's pursuit of sea access, however, unfolds in a region marked by interstate mistrust, proxy competition, armed conflict, and overlapping external military interests. Viewing sea access solely through a bilateral or security lens overlooks the crucial importance of commercial viability, regional legitimacy, and long-term stability.

The challenge is threefold: secure reliable port and shipping access based on mutually agreed terms; increase the ability to detect and respond to proliferating maritime threats; and retain strategic autonomy by eschewing exclusive alignments that would draw Ethiopia into regional rivalries. These challenges call for peaceful negotiations and mutually beneficial arrangements with neighboring transit states, consistent with principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity [3]. Access to ports, transit rights, logistics investment and corridor development should not lead to increased regional insecurity. Durable access depends on confidence, operational stability and shared economic gains.

• Establish a whole-of-government Red Sea strategy. Develop a strategic plan for the above issues in coordination with other agencies, ensuring its constant evaluation and updates. Establish an inter-agency body to define priorities, allocate duties, assess risks, and coordinate the process. It is also essential to differentiate between requirements for short-term commercial access to ports and corridors and long-term maritime security plans and to develop criteria for assessing such agreements.

• Institutionalize proactive multi-vector diplomacy. Ethiopia must cultivate strong relationships with regional and global actors while carefully avoiding dependency on any single country or geopolitical bloc. Its engagements with Gulf countries, Türkiye, Israel, Iran, the United States, China, the European Union, and African partners should be strategically pursued based on national interest priorities, clearly defined agreements, and tangible outcomes. A multi-vector foreign policy does not imply neutrality on all fronts; rather, it is a meticulously calculated approach to critical policy decisions. When evaluating potential partnerships, Ethiopia should consider factors such as economic significance, security implications, financial ramifications, and the impact on neighboring countries.

• Make a Horn-first approach the foundation of regional policy. Ethiopia's maritime interests are inextricably linked to the stability of the Horn. Therefore, its diplomacy should prioritize confidence-building, consultations with transit countries, infrastructure development, trade facilitation, and robust dispute resolution mechanisms. Regional cooperation can transform sea access and connectivity from sources of mistrust into drivers of mutual economic benefit. Ethiopia must clearly articulate its objectives for sea access while remaining considerate of neighbors' concerns and advocating for equitable systems.

• Diversify commercial port access and transport corridors. Ethiopia must diversify its access to port facilities through peaceful negotiations. This strategy will minimize the risk of disruption in any single corridor and strengthen Ethiopia's position when negotiating services, reliability, and price. When considering port access, the focus should extend beyond port fees to encompass total logistics costs, including border crossing procedures, security, capacity, transit time, and infrastructure reliability. Ethiopia should invest in roads, railways, dry ports, customs, and logistics infrastructure to connect alternative corridors. This diversification effort should be both realistic and market-driven.

• Develop maritime and naval capabilities in phases. To address its maritime interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Ethiopia could pursue the phased development of naval capabilities in accordance with its national priorities, available resources, and applicable legal arrangements. This task must be executed in a phased manner, with an estimated cost schedule. It should begin with developing expertise in areas such as maritime knowledge, specialized training, diplomacy and legal affairs, commercial shipping, intelligence analysis, and coordination with other states. Enhanced maritime domain awareness and information sharing could help Ethiopia identify threats to its shipping interests.

• Strengthen regional maritime-security cooperation. Ethiopia should facilitate pragmatic regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea to improve information sharing, prevent piracy, enhance maritime domain awareness, and address threats from non-state actors. Initiatives should operate within existing frameworks to avoid duplication and leverage established relationships. Technical cooperation based on common security interests remains feasible even amidst differing geopolitical approaches.

• Build economic resilience against maritime disruption. Maritime strategy must be linked with domestic economic preparedness. This includes maintaining proper strategic reserves, diversifying energy sources, improving logistics, developing contingency plans for vital imports, and protecting infrastructure. Both government and businesses need to identify vulnerabilities and create effective response plans for potential disruptions or increases in shipping costs. While this will not solve all problems, it will significantly reduce the economic impact of such shocks.

Immediate priorities (0-1 Year)

• Create an interagency task force to formulate the national strategy for the Red Sea.

• Develop maps showing existing vulnerabilities in trade routes.

• Formulate criteria for evaluating port and corridor agreements.

• Commence consultation process with transit countries.

• Draw contingency plans in the event of disruptions to the maritime routes.

Medium-term priorities (1–3 years).

• Seek commercially-based access and transit arrangements.

• Emphasize transport corridor constraints and customs reform.

• Develop maritime training and maritime domain awareness.

• Conduct diplomatic consultations on Red Sea/Gulf of Aden security issues.

Long-term priorities (3–10 years).

• Develop a sustainable institution for maritime security and approach naval capabilities in a pragmatic and phased manner.

• Promote regional economic integration, improve logistics infrastructure, and develop maritime governance by Africans.

• Any long-term activities need to be analyzed from the point of view of fiscal prudence, benefits to the nation, and regional trust-building

Partners might misread multi-vector diplomacy as inconsistency. Therefore, the country must maintain policy consistency, honor agreements, and clearly articulate the purpose of each partnership. Diversification will be costly if corridors are chosen for symbolic reasons, necessitating a thorough cost-benefit analysis.

Developing maritime capabilities could raise concerns among neighboring countries without proper communication and collaboration. Ethiopia should adopt a phased approach, explaining its rationale for commercial protection. Instability, however, could undermine all of Ethiopia's agreements and diversification efforts

Ethiopia's Red Sea strategy should be guided by strategic autonomy, regional collaboration, and pragmatism. As a nation highly dependent on maritime transport, the accessibility and security of its sea lanes are vital interests. However, these interests cannot be sustainably protected through confrontation, exclusive alignments, or reliance on any single external power.

Success will be measured by stable and cost-effective trade, economic and operational resilience during maritime crises, strong regional relationships, and autonomous decision-making. By prioritizing peaceful arrangements, pragmatic economic policies, and African collaboration, Ethiopia can effectively safeguard its maritime interests

[1] World Bank. “Addis-Djibouti Corridor to Get Major Upgrade That Is Key to Unlocking Connectivity and Trade for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.” July 20, 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa

[2] UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). “Red Sea Crisis and Implications for Trade Facilitation in Africa.” April 17, 2024. https://unctad.org/news/red-sea-crisis-and-implications-trade-facilitation-africa

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. “Ankara Declaration by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Somalia.” December 11, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa