Article•11 min read•September 21, 2026

The Reciprocity Test After Washington’s Sanctions Expiration

The Reciprocity Test After Washington’s Sanctions Expiration
The Reciprocity Test After Washington’s Sanctions Expiration


A New Diplomatic Setting

When Washington allowed the national emergency behind its 2021 Eritrea sanctions to lapse on 18 September, ending measures against Eritrea’s ruling party and military, the first regional reaction was to read the decision as a verdict.1,2 On that reading, the United States had chosen Asmara over Addis Ababa and Ethiopia had lost an important source of external leverage. That interpretation is understandable, but the decision does not by itself establish such a conclusion.

The expiration of the sanctions is not a judgment on the relationship between two neighbours. It removes one external instrument from the equation and places greater weight on the conduct of the parties themselves. The State Department said the decision advances U.S. regional interests, described implementation of the Pretoria Agreement as uneven, and said Washington will engage both countries. This suggests a shift toward direct engagement with both governments rather than an explicit alignment with either side.

This brief argues for what we term the reciprocity test: normalization between neighbours is more durable when it is matched by reciprocal, verifiable conduct. The principle should apply equally to both sides and should be advanced through regional diplomacy rather than external conditionality. Ethiopia is well placed to promote such an approach, given its longstanding preference for engagement and dialogue.

What the Reciprocity Test Requires

The test is a practical standard, not a condition imposed on either country. It rests on four benchmarks consistent with principles accepted by both states under the UN Charter and the African Union’s Constitutive Act.

First is respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Second is non-interference: neither state should host, fund or direct formations opposed to the other, or undertake actions that undermine the other’s domestic political processes and agreed peace arrangements. 

Third is a working channel for dialogue, so that grievances are addressed through diplomacy rather than public signalling. 

Fourth is a shared commitment to a stable southern Red Sea, where both states have a direct strategic interest.
These benchmarks reflect the spirit of the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship signed in Asmara on 9 July 2018.

Why the Sequence Matters

What distinguishes 2026 from 2018 is the sequence. In November 2018, the UN Security Council terminated its sanctions regime on Eritrea after Ethiopia and Eritrea had already restored relations. The current sequence is different: the U.S. sanctions framework has expired before a comparable bilateral normalization process has been consolidated.

When the sequence changes, the basis for confidence-building must come increasingly from direct regional engagement. Any conditions Washington may attach to its broader engagement are not necessarily visible to the region. A transparent regional standard can therefore help make expectations clearer, while applying the same principles to both sides.

A Changing Red Sea Environment

Washington’s stated rationale is regional interests, and the wider security environment helps explain the decision. Houthi forces have significantly expanded their control along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including the strategic port of Mocha and Perim Island, increasing pressure around the Bab al-Mandeb.Against that backdrop, the sanctions decision can be understood primarily in the context of wider Red Sea security considerations rather than as a political verdict on the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Assistant Secretary Frank Garcia was in Addis Ababa from 2 to 6 September, discussing de-escalation and implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos. For Ethiopia, the practical implication is a greater need for direct regional diplomacy as external leverage becomes less prominent. Ethiopia has a substantial stake in a stable maritime environment because its economy depends on access to the regional coastline it does not control. The Foreign Minister has described sea access as a strategic priority to be pursued through diplomacy and dialogue.The end of sanctions may also reduce formal barriers to some commercial arrangements involving Eritrean state-linked entities. That possibility makes the dialogue track more consequential, not less.

Questions About the New Approach

One concern is that sanctions relief without visible conditions could reduce incentives for reciprocal commitments. Another is that Washington’s reference to uneven implementation of the Pretoria Agreement signals that its engagement will continue to be linked to wider regional developments. A further concern is that engaging both capitals could reduce the diplomatic space Ethiopia gained from the 2018 opening. Finally, a reciprocity standard could be misunderstood as an attempt to slow Eritrea’s return to wider international engagement.

These concerns can be addressed by keeping the proposed standard reciprocal, transparent and open to both sides. The approach does not seek to obstruct Eritrea’s international engagement. It instead places emphasis on conduct that supports stable relations between neighbours. The reference to Pretoria should be understood in the context of implementation commitments already accepted by the parties, while engagement with both capitals is consistent with the principle of dialogue that Ethiopia itself advanced in 2018.A standard that applies equally to Ethiopia and Eritrea is therefore not an instrument of obstruction. It is a public commitment to predictable conduct and mutual restraint.

Ethiopia’s Strategic Priorities

Ethiopia’s strategic priorities converge on three areas. First is security at home and along the frontier: a predictable relationship with its neighbour, a calm border environment and a peace process protected from external interference support the development agenda of the Federal Government. Second is access to the sea. An environment in which reciprocal commitments are being met creates greater space for commercial and port discussions; continued tensions would narrow that space. Third is Ethiopia’s regional diplomatic standing. As the host of the African Union, Ethiopia has an interest in being seen as a state that supports fair and workable regional principles.

The AU has already provided an institutional channel. On 25 March, it appointed former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete as High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, with a mandate covering preventive diplomacy, inclusive dialogue and confidence-building. That mandate provides an appropriate African framework through which the reciprocity test could be discussed.

Turning the Principle into Policy

First, the new government should state the standard publicly in its opening weeks, welcoming engagement with Eritrea while setting out the four reciprocal benchmarks in a short, even-toned statement consistent with the Foreign Minister’s position of November 2025. The inauguration, reported for early October, provides an opportunity for Ethiopia to set a constructive regional tone rather than simply react to developments.

Second, Ethiopia should invite the AU High Representative to facilitate a confidence-building track between Addis Ababa and Asmara based on the four benchmarks. An African-led process would provide a regional framework for dialogue and confidence-building while drawing on existing continental mechanisms.

Third, Addis Ababa should use its channel with Washington to encourage coordination between the policy of engaging both governments and continued support for implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, while recognizing that U.S. policy toward Eritrea is ultimately determined by Washington.

Fourth, Ethiopia should keep the economic and connectivity track open. Consistent with the Foreign Minister’s position that sea access should be pursued through dialogue, Addis Ababa should remain prepared to discuss mutually beneficial commercial and port arrangements while respecting the sovereignty and interests of both states.

Conclusion

The expiration of U.S. sanctions closes one chapter but settles nothing between neighbours. It changes the diplomatic setting in which Ethiopia and Eritrea must manage their relationship. What follows should be judged less by external measures than by conduct: respect for sovereignty, non-interference, sustained dialogue and a shared interest in Red Sea stability. Ethiopia advocated engagement over isolation in 2018. In 2026, the reciprocity test provides a practical way to carry that principle forward—through an approach that keeps the door to normalization open while making mutual responsibility visible.

Notes

1. Al Jazeera, “US Lifts Sanctions on Eritrea ‘to Advance US Regional Interests’ in Red Sea,” September 19, 2026.
2. Associated Press, “US Lifts Sanctions Targeting Eritrea’s Ruling Party and the Military,” U.S. News & World Report, September 19, 2026.
3. Agence France-Presse, “US Lifts Eritrea Sanctions Imposed over Ethiopian War to Advance Regional Interests,” Malay Mail, September 19, 2026.
4. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945; Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, art. 4.
5. “Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Ethiopia and Eritrea,” Asmara, July 9, 2018.
6. UN Security Council, Resolution 2444 (2018), S/RES/2444, November 14, 2018.
7. Al Jazeera, “Red Sea Nations Watch as Houthis Seize Bab al-Mandeb Strait,” September 13, 2026.
8. U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, “Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Frank Garcia Travels to Ethiopia,” September 6, 2026.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, “Speech by Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos at the Foreign Policy Forum on Developments in the Horn of Africa,” November 14, 2025.
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, “Speech by Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos.”
11. African Union, “Chairperson of the AU Commission Appoints President Jakaya Kikwete as the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea,” press release, March 25, 2026.


By Sifan gudeta, IFA


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