Strategic Latitude: How BRICS Membership Is Widening Ethiopia’s Room to Maneuver

Ethiopia’s geography has always been an important factor in its foreign and economic policy. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been landlocked and has depended on neighboring countries for access to international maritime trade. Today, more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s import-export trade by volume moves through the Addis-Djibouti corridor.¹ This makes Djibouti an essential economic partner, but it also creates a strategic vulnerability when external trade depends heavily on one principal corridor. Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS on 1 January 2024 should therefore be understood within a broader effort to expand the country’s strategic options.² BRICS is significant not because it replaces existing partners or offers an alternative to the Western system, but because it can widen Ethiopia’s economic, financial and diplomatic choices. The central question is whether Addis Ababa can convert this wider network into greater strategic latitude: the capacity to pursue national interests without excessive dependence on any single external partner.

For Ethiopia, the objective should not be to reduce dependence on Djibouti by simply replacing one corridor with another. A more sustainable approach is to build a network of commercially viable and politically durable connections. The Addis-Djibouti corridor will remain critical, and international investment continues to improve it. In June 2026, the World Bank approved an additional $45 million to strengthen connectivity, logistics efficiency and road safety along the corridor.³ The strategic issue is therefore not whether Ethiopia should maintain its relationship with Djibouti, but whether it can develop sufficient alternatives to reduce exposure to disruption and improve its negotiating position. For a landlocked country, connectivity is not only an economic issue; it is an element of national resilience. Corridor optionality can lower logistical risk, improve bargaining power and give Ethiopia greater flexibility as regional and global conditions change.

BRICS provides Ethiopia with a platform to deepen relationships with major emerging economies across Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The grouping now consists of 11 members, including China, India, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Iran, Indonesia and Ethiopia.⁴ Their interests and foreign-policy priorities differ considerably, so BRICS should not be treated as a unified geopolitical bloc. For Ethiopia, that diversity is an advantage. China can remain important for infrastructure, investment and manufacturing; India offers access to a major market, technology capabilities and the Indian Ocean economy; Gulf states have significant interests in investment, logistics and the Red Sea; while Brazil and South Africa can deepen South-South cooperation in agriculture, industry and multilateral diplomacy. Ethiopia’s advantage lies in engaging these partners selectively, according to sector and national priority, rather than aligning exclusively with any one of them.

BRICS membership, however, does not automatically generate economic benefits. Its value depends on what Ethiopia is able to negotiate, attract and implement. Addis Ababa should therefore move from broad diplomatic engagement toward a focused economic agenda: expanding markets for Ethiopian exports, attracting investment that strengthens domestic production, promoting technology and skills transfer, and mobilizing financing for infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and energy. Recent developments illustrate the diplomatic potential of this engagement. At the 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi, member states supported Ethiopia’s efforts toward World Trade Organization accession and backed its candidacy for an expanded seat on the International Civil Aviation Organization Council.⁵ Such support does not guarantee outcomes, but it shows how BRICS diplomacy can reinforce Ethiopia’s bilateral efforts and strengthen its position in international institutions.

The next step is to convert political access into measurable economic outcomes. Ethiopia could prioritize sectors where BRICS relationships can complement domestic development objectives—for example, agro-processing and value-added exports, manufacturing, energy, logistics, digital infrastructure and technology-intensive services. The quality of investment should matter as much as its volume. Projects that create local supply chains, increase exports, transfer skills or technology and reduce structural bottlenecks would contribute more to strategic latitude than financing that expands external dependence without strengthening domestic productive capacity.

Financial diversification is another important dimension of Ethiopia’s strategic latitude. Ethiopia should seek a broader range of financing sources rather than relying excessively on any single institution, currency or external partner. This does not mean abandoning the US dollar or Western financial institutions, which remain important to Ethiopia’s international economic relations. The objective is to increase the number of credible options. The New Development Bank could become one component of this strategy. Ethiopia is currently listed by the NDB as a prospective member, meaning its accession process has advanced but it has not yet become a full member.⁶ If completed, membership could provide an additional channel for financing development priorities. Its strategic value would lie in complementing—not replacing—the World Bank, IMF and other financing institutions. Diversification strengthens autonomy only when it creates genuine alternatives.

The Red Sea gives Ethiopia’s diversification strategy a wider geopolitical dimension. Although landlocked, Ethiopia sits close to one of the world’s most important maritime systems. The Red Sea links the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb, connecting major commercial routes between Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Ethiopia’s need for reliable maritime access is therefore inseparable from the politics and economics of the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region. Its 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland regarding access to the Berbera port demonstrated the importance Addis Ababa attaches to maritime connectivity, but the agreement also generated strong opposition from Somalia and highlighted the sovereignty sensitivities surrounding such arrangements.⁷ The lesson is not that Ethiopia should abandon the search for alternatives, but that connectivity policy must combine economic necessity with careful regional diplomacy.

A more resilient approach would treat regional corridors as complementary options rather than exclusive geopolitical choices. Djibouti will remain Ethiopia’s principal gateway, but additional commercially viable routes can improve resilience, introduce competition in logistics and reduce the risks associated with excessive concentration. The strategic objective should be reliable and diversified access achieved through negotiated, sustainable regional arrangements. In this sense, maritime connectivity is not separate from Ethiopia’s BRICS strategy: both are ultimately about increasing the number and quality of options available to the country.

Ethiopia’s engagement with BRICS should therefore form part of a multi-aligned foreign-policy approach. Addis Ababa can deepen relations with BRICS members while maintaining partnerships with the United States, European Union, international financial institutions, Gulf countries and African neighbors. These relationships are not inherently contradictory. Strategic latitude comes from avoiding unnecessary choices between competing centers of power, cooperating where interests converge, managing disagreements where they arise and preserving sufficient flexibility to make decisions according to national priorities. The objective is not complete independence from external influence—which is unrealistic in an interconnected global economy—but greater capacity to negotiate from a position of choice.

The central test is whether diversified partnerships strengthen Ethiopia’s domestic capabilities. More partners do not automatically produce greater autonomy. If dependence simply shifts from one external actor to another for infrastructure, financing, technology or markets, Ethiopia’s strategic position may change without becoming stronger. Partnerships should therefore be assessed by their contribution to productive capacity, export growth, technological development, infrastructure, employment and long-term economic resilience. Ethiopia’s large domestic market, geographic position, diplomatic role and development potential provide bargaining assets, but those assets must be translated into concrete negotiating objectives.

Ethiopia’s growing participation in global governance creates additional opportunities. The country is preparing to host COP32 in Addis Ababa in 2027, providing another platform for engagement on climate finance, development and South-South cooperation.⁸ Such diplomatic opportunities can complement BRICS engagement by widening Ethiopia’s networks and increasing its international visibility. Yet visibility is not the same as leverage. Leverage emerges when relationships create concrete economic and political options: when investment expands productive capacity, connectivity increases trade, financing supports national priorities, and diplomatic relationships strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating space.

Translating this wider network into strategic latitude requires deliberate sequencing rather than broad diplomatic gestures. First, Ethiopia should anchor its BRICS engagement in sector-specific negotiations—agro-processing, energy, logistics and digital infrastructure—so that each partnership produces a measurable increase in productive capacity rather than standing as a diplomatic milestone in itself. Second, Addis Ababa should pursue New Development Bank membership as a complement to, not a substitute for, its relationships with the World Bank and IMF, ensuring that financial diversification adds genuine options rather than shifting dependency from one lender to another. Third, Ethiopia should manage its maritime corridors as a portfolio rather than a series of exclusive choices, expanding capacity at Djibouti while pursuing additional arrangements through negotiation and regional diplomacy rather than confrontation.

BRICS offers Ethiopia an opportunity to expand its strategic latitude, but it is not a substitute for strategy itself. Its value lies in the additional relationships, markets, financing channels and diplomatic networks Ethiopia can develop through the grouping. The objective should therefore be diversification, not replacement; partnership, not dependency; and leverage, not bloc alignment. Ethiopia does not need to choose between BRICS and the West, nor between one maritime corridor and another. Its long-term interest is to build enough credible economic and diplomatic options to avoid excessive dependence on any single external actor.

The real measure of Ethiopia’s BRICS membership will not be the symbolism of joining the grouping, but whether Addis Ababa can convert membership into stronger productive capacity, wider markets, more resilient connectivity and greater diplomatic flexibility. BRICS can provide Ethiopia with a wider platform. The strategic task is to turn that platform into leverage.

BRICS Brazil. "Ethiopia's Accession to BRICS." Official BRICS information, January 1, 2024.

BRICS Brazil. "The BRICS Grouping and Its Eleven Members." Official BRICS information, 2026.

Ethiopian News Agency (ENA). "Ethiopia's COP32 Presidency and BRICS Environmental Cooperation." ENA, 2026.

New Development Bank. "Members." New Development Bank, accessed 2026.

Prime Minister's Office of India. 2026 BRICS New Delhi Declaration. New Delhi: Government of India, September 2026.

Reuters. "Landlocked Ethiopia Signs Pact to Use Somaliland's Red Sea Port." Reuters, January 1, 2024.

World Bank. "Addis-Djibouti Corridor to Get Major Upgrade That Is Key to Unlocking Connectivity and Trade for Ethiopia." World Bank, July 20, 2023.

World Bank. "Additional Financing to Strengthen Djibouti's Regional Economic Corridor." World Bank, June 18, 2026.

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